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In 1990, the marginal cost of training one pilot through the CAT II stage of his
career ranges from a low of $394,000 for P-3 pilots to a high of $1,348,278 for F-14
pilots (Morrissey, 1990). 1 This is a significant monetary investment in human capital that
the Navy makes to ensure its pilots are as qualified as possible to perform their required
duties. To protect this investment, the Navy strives to retain aviators beyond the
completion of the minimum service requirement (MSR) incurred from flight training. MSR
policies have traditionally been structured to ensure that the investment outlays for
training aviators have been recovered by expiration of MSR. All officers incur an initial
MSR upon their commissioning into the service This obligated service commitment is
generally four years from the date of commissioning. For some more technically
specialized communities such as aviation and nuclear power, an additional commitment is
incurred to compensate for the increased costs and extended time required for the
specialized training.
The obligated service incurred from flight training increased from five years from
the completion of flight training or 'Winging" to six years in 1987, then to seven years for
helicopter and propeller pilots and eight years for jet pilots in July 1988. Currently there is
1 According to a March 1990 Economic Analysis Report titled The Cost ofPilot Training
by Bill Morrissey and Steve Cylke, these figures include the cost of Undergraduate Flight
Training, CAT I training which is usually a pilot's first advanced training in a specific fleet
aircraft and CAT II training which is refresher training for a pilot who has previous fleet
experience (one tour or more) in that aircraft.
a proposed increase to a maximum of nine years for the sub-community ofjet pilots These
changes in obligated service commitments have resulted in aviators' careers being
lengthened to almost eleven years (when the approximately two years to complete flight
training is factored in) before they are even eligible to voluntarily leave the service. This
length of service in itself is a significant factor in predicting the accession behavior of
individuals as the increases in obligated service tend to weigh heavily in the minds of
young officers making the decision to enter the aviation career 'pipeline" versus a shorter
pipeline such as that of the surface warfare community. Once they have entered the
aviation community pipeline, retention of these individuals becomes a primary concern of
the Navy
The retention ofNaval aviators has been studied for many years, probably since the
advent of Naval aviation, but is still considered to be a 'hot topic" among Navy policy
makers. There are an inordinate number of factors that contribute to an aviator's decision
to remain in the service or to leave and seek employment in the civilian sector. Many of
these factors are difficult to quantify as they deal with 'gut feelings" and human behavioral
factors. This thesis will quantitatively examine several institutional and non-institutional
factors that may have contributed to recent changes in aviator retention in the United
States Navy. The primary research question it will seek to answer is, 'What have been the
separate impacts of various institutional and non-institutional factors on the retention of
naval aviators between 1990 and 1997?" Subsidiary questions include:
1)
Can we build a simulation model that can be used to predict future behavior
by reproducing similar scenarios based on past events and behaviors?
2 ) What caused an unexpected 'fcpike" in the pilot cumulative retention rate
(CCR) for FY96?
3 What caused the upward trend in pilot CCR for years of service 3 through 12
from FY95 through FY97 while the rates for other officer communities
remained basically constant?
4 Which institutional factors have significantly contributed to recent changes in
aviator retention? For example, have recent changes in MSR policies
contributed to an increase in aviator continuation rates?
5) Which non-institutional factors (such as changes in civilian employment
opportunities) have significantly contributed to recent changes in aviator
retention?
The answers to these questions will provide valuable insights into the retention
behavior of individuals and will allow policy makers and officer community planners to
structure future decisions based on quantifiable results.
The plan of this thesis is as follows: Chapters II and III provide background
information and a comprehensive review of literature pertinent to this study. Chapter IV
discusses the data and methodology used in this study. Chapter V analyzes the data and
presents results of a statistical model constructed to predict future behavior. The final
chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations drawn from the study.
Scope of Thesis
This thesis will focus only on the 'pilot" community of aviators. Past studies have
shown that the retention behavior of naval flight officers (NFOs) differs significantly from
that of pilots due to factors such as available job opportunities in the airline industry and
the relative effects of incentive programs such as aviation continuation pay (AC?) and
variable separation incentive (VSI). The thesis will analyze pilot retention/continuation
behavior between 1990 and 1997 and examine the effects of several different institutional
and non-institutional factors on that behavior. It will focus on the career period at which
the initial MSR is fulfilled because that is considered the most critical point at which
retention can still be controlled to a certain extent by policies and programs. After this
point, retirement benefits become the primary incentive motivating retention
Data for this thesis will be cultivated from the Officer Master File through the
Officer Personnel Information System (PC-OPIS). OPIS provides historical aggregate
officer retention/continuation behavior. The data from this source originate in Bureau of
Personnel (BUPERS) Officer Personnel Records, which are then screened and
summarized by Naval Personnel Research and Development Center's (NPRDC) 'FATM-
O" system, converted into OPIS III input files, and finally converted into PC-OPIS input
files. These files are accessible through the Highlander data query software. Cohort data
constructed from this database will be used to examine the effects of several different
variables on retention rates. These variables will include institutional factors such as
commissioning source, aviation qualification designator (AQD), and MSR policies while
the non-institutional factors will include various economic factors such as monetary
bonuses (like ACP), national unemployment rates, and civilian job opportunities. These
factors were chosen because airline hiring rates, airline pay and total unemployment have
been proven to be the primary factors affecting retention behavior of Naval aviators
(Cymrot, 1989) Once all of the significant factors have been analyzed, a simple Excel




Currently, analysts use historical retention behavior to predict future behavior.
There are several different methods one can use to measure this historical retention
behavior but the most appropriate aggregate retention method is generally considered to
be the one that most accurately predicts observed future behavior. Historical continuation
rates provide insight into the behavior of officers at different points in their careers while
cumulative rates summarize the past experience of a group of officers, which is often a
critical determinant of future behavior (Mackin, 1996). Three alternative retention
measures are most commonly used by personnel analysts and planners. These alternatives
include MSR survival rates, spot continuation rates, and cumulative continuation rates
(CCRs)
The first type of retention measure studied is the analysis ofMSR survival rates.
This measure takes an inventory of officers in a specific year group two years after the
completion of their MSR divided by the inventory one year before the completion of
MSR. This is done because this period typically encompasses the time when the largest
number of voluntary losses occur. This rate is useful in that time-series variation in the
MSR survival rates gives analysts some indication of the availability of officers for future
years. These rates are most susceptible to policy changes that are intended to induce short-
term changes in retention behavior. Examples of these policy changes include aviation
continuation pays (ACP) and variable separation incentives (VSI) that target specific
subgroups with monetary incentives in order to either increase or decrease retention.
Previous studies have been conducted to determine the actual effects of these policy
changes.
Spot continuation rates are simply the number of officers in a year group who
were on active duty on the last day of the fiscal year divided by the number of officers in
the same year group on active duty on the first day of that fiscal year. This definition
makes the assumption that the retention rate will include net lateral transfers because if it
excludes these lateral transfers, the rate would be the proportion of officers who were on
active duty on the first day of the fiscal year who were still on active duty on the last day
of the fiscal year (Mackin, 1996). Tables 2.1a through 2. If summarize the spot
continuation rates computed for each separate pilot community from 1992 through 1997.
For example, Table 2.1a shows the beginning and ending inventories for all 13 IX (pilot)
designated officers (net of lateral transfers) for year groups 1960 through 1991 as of the
final day of that fiscal year, September 30, 1992. Because these inventories are 'net of
lateral transfers', the ending inventories of one year do not always match the beginning
inventories of the next year. Dividing the ending inventory by the beginning inventory, the
spot continuation rate is derived and shown in column 3 of the table. For example, for
year group 1991, dividing 79 by 80 yields 98.75%. The continuation rates (CR's) for years
six through eleven and three through twelve are computed as the sum of the end
inventories in those specific years divided by the sum of the beginning inventories for
those same year groups. These CR's are also displayed in Tables 2.1a through 2. If.
Table 2. la.
FY 1992 Pilot Continuation Rates
YEAR GROUP BEGIN FY INVENTORY END INVENTORY CONTINUATION RATE
91 80 79 98.75%
90 120 119 99.17%
89 725 711 98.07%
88 804 783 97.39%
87 1009 961 95.24%
86 1173 1071 91.30%
85 881 712 80.82%
84 449 334 74.39%
83 407 322 79. 12%
82 380 357 93.95%
81 403 322 79.90%
80 215 203 94.42%
79 236 227 96.19%
78 232 220 94.83%
77 245 230 93.88%
76 221 199 90.05%
75 254 246 96.85%
74 308 305 99.03%
73 260 236 90.77%
72 231 161 69.70%
71 130 101 77.69%
70 142 111 78.17%
69 169 137 81.07%
68 122 102 83.61%
67 140 99 70.71%
66 91 59 64.84%
65 46 27 58.70%
64 33 27 81.82%
63 25 20 80.00%
62 14 5 35.71%
61 7 1 14.29%
60 0.00%
TOTALS 9552 8487
3 YRS - 12 YRS CR
(YG 80 - 89) CCR
89.60
27.87
6 YRS - 1 1 YRS CR
(YG81 -86) CCR
84.40
32.52 Source: PERS 233
Table 2. lb.
FY 1993 Pilot Continuation Rates
YEAR GROUP BEGIN FY INVENTORY END INVENTORY CONTINUATION RATE
92 111 108 97.30%
91 109 106 97.25%
90 452 448 99.12%
89 900 876 97.33%
88 815 771 94.60%
87 982 926 94.30%
86 1086 942 86.74%
85 723 574 79.39%
84 345 295 85.51%
83 321 296 92.21%
82 358 297 82.96%
81 321 288 89.72%
80 215 202 93.95%
79 227 221 97.36%
78 218 213 97.71%
77 235 228 97.02%
76 205 203 99.02%
75 264 257 97.35%
74 305 267 87.54%
73 232 165 71.12%
72 159 123 77.36%
71 103 92 89.32%
70 112 100 89.29%
69 136 111 81.62%
68 102 83 81.37%
67 100 74 74.00%
66 59 39 66.10%
65 27 20 74.07%
64 27 18 66.67%
63 20 6 30.00%
62 5 1 20.00%
61 1 0.00%
TOTALS 9275 8350




6 YRS - 1 1 YRS CR
(YG 82 - 87) CCR
87.20
42.32 Source: PERS 233
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Table 2.1c
FY 1994 Pilot Continuation Rates
YEAR GROUP BEGIN FY INVENTORY END INVENTORY CONTINUATION RATE
93 25 25 100.00%
92 138 133 96.38%
91 269 259 96.28%
90 782 743 95.01%
89 919 828 90.10%
88 796 730 91.71%
87 935 832 88.98%
86 945 746 78.94%
85 586 487 83.11%
84 297 262 88.22%
83 294 250 85.03%
82 300 274 91.33%
81 291 282 96.91%
80 202 196 97.03%
79 221 212 95.93%
78 212 163 76.89%
77 228 176 77.19%
76 203 141 69.46%
75 260 197 75.77%
74 267 182 68.16%
73 163 127 77.91%
72 123 91 73.98%
71 92 70 76.09%
70 101 79 78.22%
69 112 70 62.50%
68 83 49 59.04%
67 74 41 55.41%
66 39 16 41.03%
65 20 17 85.00%
64 18 8 44.44%
63 6 1 16.67%
62 1 0.00%
TOTALS 9002 7687
3 YRS - 12 YRS CR
(YG 82 - 91) CCR
88.30
30.09
6 YRS - 1 1 YRS CR
(YG 83 - 88) CCR
85.80
40.07 Source: PERS 233
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Table 2 Id.
FY 1995 Pilot Continuation Rates
YEAR GROUP BEGIN FY INVENTORY END INVENTORY CONTINUATION RATE
94 10 9 90.00%
93 27 26 96.30%
92 245 242 98.78%
91 426 411 96.48%
90 835 816 97.72%
89 839 780 92.97%
88 733 660 90.04%
87 849 664 78.21%
86 752 553 73.54%
85 487 414 85.01%
84 262 224 85.50%
83 246 210 85.37%
82 275 268 97.45%
81 282 279 98.94%
80 195 189 96.92%
79 213 187 87.79%
78 164 157 95.73%
77 176 165 93.75%
76 141 124 87.94%
75 197 131 66.50%
74 182 123 67.58%
73 130 105 80.77%
72 91 81 89.01%
71 70 46 65.71%
70 79 47 59.49%
69 70 43 61.43%
68 49 25 51.02%
67 41 27 65.85%
66 16 6 37.50%
65 17 3 17.65%
64 8 2 25.00%
63 1 1 100.00%
TOTALS 8108 7018
3 YRS - 12 YRS CR
(YG 83 - 92) CCR
87.60
27.66
6 YRS - 1 1 YRS CR
(YG 84 - 89) CCR
84.00
34.88 Source: PERS 233
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Table 2. le.
FY 1996 Pilot Continuation Rates
YEAR GROUP BEGIN FY INVENTORY END INVENTORY CONTINUATION RATE
95 7 7 100.00%
94 10 10 100.00%
93 78 77 98.72%
92 533 528 99.06%
91 589 579 98.30%
90 848 824 97.17%
89 780 725 92.95%
88 665 565 84.96%
87 668 555 83.08%
86 551 479 86.93%
85 408 332 81.37%
84 222 167 75.23%
83 209 204 97.61%
82 267 261 97.75%
81 276 265 96.01%
80 189 148 78.31%
79 189 162 85.71%
78 156 154 98.72%
77 165 157 95.15%
76 124 101 81.45%
75 132 112 84.85%
74 126 117 92.86%
73 119 107 89.92%
72 88 66 75.00%
71 55 48 87.27%
70 56 44 78.57%
69 48 33 68.75%
68 28 19 67.86%
67 30 24 80.00%




3 YRS - 12 YRS CR
(YG 84 - 93) CCR
90.40
32.43
6 YRS - 1 1 YRS CR
(YG 85 - 90) CCR
88.70
44.90 Source: PERS 233
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Table 2. If.
FY 1997 Pilot Continuation Rates
YEAR GROUP BEGIN FY INVENTORY END INVENTORY CONTINUATION RATE
96 0.00%
95 12 12 100.00%
94 68 68 100.00%
93 423 417 98.58%
92 657 650 98.93%
91 582 566 97.25%
90 827 794 96.01%
89 729 634 86.97%
88 563 421 74.78%
87 554 456 82.31%
86 476 383 80.46%
85 336 309 91.96%
84 165 164 99.39%
83 204 195 95.59%
82 261 256 98.08%
81 264 243 92.05%
80 149 134 89.93%
79 162 160 98.77%
78 153 148 96.73%
77 157 126 80.25%
76 101 88 87.13%
75 112 99 88.39%
74 121 114 94.21%
73 107 90 84.11%
72 66 57 86.36%
71 48 42 87.50%
70 44 39 88.64%
69 34 23 67.65%
68 19 15 78.95%
67 24 1 4.17%
66 3 1 33.33%
65 0.00%
TOTALS 7421 6705
3 YRS - 12 YRS CR
(YG 85 - 94) CCR
90.00
35.88
6 YRS - 1 1 YRS CR
(YG 86 -91) CCR
87.20
40.08 Source: PERS 233
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The third alternative retention measure that is most commonly used is the
cumulative continuation rate or CCR. It is also shown in Tables 2.1a through 2. If. CCRs
are the product of spot continuation rates for a specific length of service (LOS). These
LOS's typically encompass LOS six through eleven or three through twelve because those
specific time periods incorporate the effects of recent events and policies affecting
retention across a fairly wide band of LOSs and are easy to compute from current
continuation data (Mackin, 1996).
Figure 2.1a presents a graphic illustration of the CCRs for the pilot community
from fiscal years 1990 (FY90) through 1997 (FY97). This can be compared to Figures
2.1b and 2.1c that present the CCR's for the same time period for the unrestricted line
(URL) and the entire officer community. The graphical pattern of CCRs revealed a "spike"
or abnormal increase of more than 10 percentage points in FY96. This increase was
common throughout the ALNAV and URL communities, but was especially pronounced
in the pilot communities. Because pilots comprise approximately 60 percent of the URL
and approximately 25 percent of ALNAV, these results may be biased towards artificially
high CCRs Without pilots included, there would most likely be less of a 'fcpike" in the
URL and ALNAV graphs. For pilots, the CCR for years of service (YOS) six through
eleven increased from 34.9 percent in FY95 to 44.9 percent in FY96 and then back down
to 40. 1 percent in FY97. The CCR for YOS three through twelve basically stayed the
same for the ALNAV and URL communities from FY96 to FY97 but appears to have












































0.00 J 1 H-




























One simple explanation for this trend would attribute it to recent changes in MSR
policies that have increased the obligated service commitment for aviators. Unfortunately,
this simple explanation may not be sufficient to explain the recent fluctuations in retention
behavior. In order to clarify this problem, cumulative continuation rates must be
decomposed to differentiate between those individuals eligible to leave the Navy and those
still under some form of commitment and thus not eligible to leave. Naval Personnel
Research and Development Center (NPRDC) analysts developed an algorithm to predict
an end-of-obligated-service (EAOS) date for officers that would have been useful in
determining the eligibility of individuals to leave the service. Unfortunately, the results of
implementing this algorithm were less than satisfactory for econometric estimation
purposes (Mackin, 1996). The most straightforward way to actually determine the
eligibility of individuals to voluntarily leave is also time consuming and inefficient. Each
17
individual officer record must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
or not that individual is still under his initial MSR obligation or under some form of
additional obligated service commitment that may have been incurred because of the
receipt of ACP (the 'bonus'), Test Pilot School, Naval Postgraduate School, War College
or any other activity that may incur additional obligated service. This process would
resolve the differences in individuals eligible to leave the service from those not yet eligible
to leave the service and would provide a much more concise analysis of retention rates.
Once these two categories of individuals have been identified, an analysis of various
institutional and non-institutional factors can be conducted to explain and predict
voluntary retention decisions.
Tables 2.2a through 2.2j provide the retention statistics as of November 20, 1997
for year groups 1987 through 1990 computed on a case-by-case basis and broken down
into the original inventory of pilots and then further into the specific status of the cohort
members of each aviation community. Each table provides the number of officers who
have resigned their commission as well as those who have once failed to select (FOS) for
Lieutenant Commander which traditionally indicates that they will most likely not select
the next time around and thus should be considered with those leaving the service,
although involuntarily. It also delineates how many individuals are at a decision point, how
many have received the 'bonus", and how many have incurred an additional commitment
from Test Pilot School (TPS), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), or any of the war
colleges. Finally it provides the number of individuals who are still under their initial MSR
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obligation. The total number of individuals at their decision point, receiving the bonus or
under a commitment incurred from TPS, NPS or war college is then divided by the total
number of individuals in the year group excluding those individuals still under their MSR
commitment and thus not eligible to leave the service. For example, looking at Table 2.2a
for year group 1987, the total eligible to leave the service or under a voluntary
commitment, 47, is divided by 81 (85 originally in the cohort minus 4 still under initial
MSR) resulting in a 58 percent retention rate. Although there is no 'perfect" measure of
officer retention, this tedious process produces a retention statistic that includes only those
individuals eligible to make the stay or leave decision which clearly links the statistic to the
underlying behavior of the individual examined by separating those choosing to leave from
those choosing to stay.
19
Table 2.2a.
Retention Statistics for VFA Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
VFA YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 85 78 97 85
RESIGNATIONS 34 38 19 4
1 X FOS's 1 4
DECISION POINT 1 7 17 1
BONUS RECIPIENTS 46 26 10 1
TPS/NPSAVAR COLL 3 20 4
TOTAL 47 36 47 6
MSR 4 4 31 75
TOTAL 4 4 31 75
Total YG - MSR 81 74 66 10
RETENTION % 58% 49% 71% 60%
Table 2.2b.
Retention Statistics for VS Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
VS - PILOT YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 39 27 43 20
RESIGNATIONS 27 21 13 1
1 X FOS's 5
DECISION POINT 3
BONUS RECD7IENTS 10 3 1
TPS/NPSAVAR COLL 1 2 2
TOTAL 11 5 6
MSR 1 1 24 19
TOTAL 1 1 24 19
Total YG - MSR 38 26 19 1
RETENTION % 29% 19% 32% 0%
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Table 2.2c.
Retention Statistics for VP Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
VP - PILOT YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 102 122 168 212
RESIGNATIONS 74 93 86 23
1 X FOS's 8 11
DECISION POINT 24 28 63 23
BONUS RECIPIENTS
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 1 3 1
TOTAL 25 28 66 24
MSR 3 1 16 165
TOTAL 3 1 16 165
Total YG - MSR 99 121 152 47
RETENTION % 25% 23% 43% 51%
Table 2. 2d.
Retention Statistics for HSL Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
HSL YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 109 139 106 130
RESIGNATIONS 57 71 24 2
1 X FOS's 13 31
DECISION POINT 47 58 64 10
BONUS RECD7IENTS
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 4 4 5 9
TOTAL 51 62 69 19
MSR 1 6 13 109
TOTAL 1 6 13 109
Total YG- MSR 108 133 93 21
RETENTION % 47% 47% 74% 90%
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Table 2.2e.
Retention Statistics for HS Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
HS YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 50 30 51 57
RESIGNATIONS 15 14 4 2
1 X FOS's 6 8
DECISION POINT 22 6 31 2
BONUS RECIPIENTS 11 8 6 2
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 2 5
TOTAL 35 14 42 4
MSR 2 5 51
TOTAL 2 5 51
Total YG - MSR 50 28 46 6
RETENTION % 70% 50% 91% 67%
Table 2.2f.
Retention Statistics for HM Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
HM YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 8 20 11 22
RESIGNATIONS 2 6 3 2
1 X FOS's 1
DECISION POINT 2 10 7 1
BONUS RECD7IENTS 4 2
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 2
TOTAL 6 12 7 3
MSR 2 1 17
TOTAL 2 1 17
Total YG - MSR 8 18 10 5
RETENTION % 75% 67% 70% 60%
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Table 2.2g.
Retention Statistics for HC Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
HC YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 65 80 86 80
RESIGNATIONS 33 44 23 3
1 X FOS's 12 17
DECISION POINT 25 31 45 5
BONUS RECIPIENTS
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 6 1 2 3
TOTAL 31 32 47 8
MSR 1 4 16 69
TOTAL 1 4 16 69
Total YG - MSR 64 76 70 11
RETENTION % 48% 42% 67% 73%
Table 2.2h.
Retention Statistics for VF Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
VF - PILOT YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 62 40 63 40
RESIGNATIONS 33 21 18 2
1 X FOS's 3 12
DECISION POINT 3 3 14
BONUS RECD7IENTS 25 13 6 1
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 2 1
TOTAL 28 16 22 2
MSR 1 3 23 36
TOTAL 1 3 23 36
Total YG - MSR 61 37 40 4
RETENTION % 46% 43% 55% 50%
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Table 2.2i.
Retention Statistics for VAQ Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
VAQ - PILOT YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 44 31 34 27
RESIGNATIONS 16 16 3 1
1 X FOS's 5 8
DECISION POINT 12 6 11 1
BONUS RECIPIENTS 14 7 5
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 1
TOTAL 26 13 17 1
MSR 2 2 14 25
TOTAL 2 2 14 25
Total YG - MSR 42 29 20 2
RETENTION % 62% 45% 85% 50%
Table 2.2j.
Retention Statistics for VAW Pilots Year Groups 87-90
As of 20 November 1997
VAW - PILOT YG-87 YG-88 YG-89 YG-90
TOTAL 30 30 33 88
RESIGNATIONS 14 21 14 8
1 X FOS's 2 6
DECISION POINT 6 3 13 7
BONUS RECD7IENTS 7 5 3
TPS/NPS/WAR COLL 1
TOTAL 13 8 16 8
MSR 3 1 3 72
TOTAL 3 1 3 72
Total YG - MSR 27 29 30 16
RETENTION % 48% 28% 53% 50%
24
IIL LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the advent of Naval aviation, retention has been studied, analyzed and
examined in almost every possible way. A comprehensive review of pertinent literature has
revealed that several issues are recurrent throughout aviation history and that decision
makers and policy analysts have wrestled with these specific issues repeatedly. A majority
of the studies attempt to quantify various aspects of an aviator's career in the hope that
they can pinpoint primary causes of increases and decreases in retention rates and target
specific policies to address such problems.
A 1965 study titled Pilot Shortages Ahead? An Examination of the Compensation
of Career Military Pilots as Contrasted to Commercial Aviation Airline Pilots (Howard,
1965) is as relevant to today's aviators as it was more than thirty years ago. This study
compared the compensation of military pilots to their contemporaries employed by civilian
air carriers. It examines pilot manpower requirements in commercial aviation as well as
estimates of future trends of such requirements in the industry. The study discusses 'Vast
sums of money spent recruiting, selecting and training men possessing the required
qualifications" as well as the importance of retaining these individuals on a career basis.
One of the primary factors considered then (and today) is money and the 'Utility" of pay to
a particular individual. The author theorized that this utility should be comparable to what
a military aviator might receive in the civilian industry. The civilian industry most logically
and practically comparable to a military aviation career is that of a commercial pilot for
one of the nation's (or world's) many airlines. The author draws many parallels between
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the two careers and makes the assumption that the inconveniences and interruptions to a
military aviator's home and family life are not worth examining because it is believed that
a 'typical" airline pilot spends as much time "on the road" away from home and works just
as "odd" working hours as a 'typical" military pilot does. This assumption may be
excessively simplified in that the two careers are not as similar as the author assumes, and
if he had not made this assumption his results may have been different.
Another similarity of this study to today's retention problem is that civilian airlines
at that time were in a similar bind in that there was a shortage of trained pilots due to the
aging of their inventory and reduced inflows of trained military pilots. This is also
occurring today as mandatory retirement ages are currently forcing the retirement of
"Vietnam Era" military pilots who left the military service after the war to pursue
commercial aviation careers. This reduction in inventory coupled with recent downsizing
policies that have reduced the number of pilots being trained by the military have led to a
limited current supply of trained aviators similar to that experienced around the time of
this study. The decrease in supply is worsened by the growth in the airline industry as a
whole This shortage of trained pilots is not solely due to aviator retention issues as the
author points out that only a small percentage of the military trained pilots separating from
the services in the 'under 35" age group apply for or are apparently interested in pursuing
a career as a professional pilot in any segment of the aviation industry. Nonetheless, the
author concludes that based solely on comparative compensation, the military pilot
completing his first tour of obligated duty would be considerably better off if he followed
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the career of a commercial pilot. With the resources the military has today compared to
the resources of the airline industry for compensating its pilots, it is clear to see that this
problem is still evident today and probably will be in the future. It is the goal of policy and
decision makers to find other means of reducing the civilian-military compensation
differential in order to reduce military aviator loss.
A recent Navy Times article echoes the issues brought out more than thirty years
ago. In 'Can the Navy Stop the Flow of Departing Officers?" (15 December 1997), the
head ofNaval Aviation, RADM McGinn, states that Improving aviator's professional and
personal quality of life is the absolutely top, number one, naval aviation issue." He
recognizes that the airlines are looking for pilots and the quality of professional life for a
naval aviator is diminished by reduced flight hours, shore duty jobs that still keep aviators
away from families, spare parts shortages and a flight pay structure that can leave
squadron commanders earning less than their junior officers. These issues combined with
the 'Post-Tailhook culture shock", post-drawdown turbulence and resource-requirements
imbalances, have fueled discontent and led aviators to state that 'ready rooms and flight
lines just aren't as much fun as they used to be " To counter these problems, RADM
McGinn has cited the increase in ACP (as of October 1 , 1 997) up to a maximum allowable
annual disbursement of $25,000 (from $12,000), an increase in aviation career incentive
pay (ACIP) (as of January 1, 1999) to a maximum monthly disbursement of $840 (from
$650), and efforts to reduce time away from home between deployments. Whether or not
these changes will have a significant impact on aviator retention remains to be seen. The
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important issue is that retention is a viable concern for policy makers and ongoing study of
factors affecting it is a necessity.
One study that attempted to examine causes and predict retention rates was Naval
Aviator Retention: Predicting Retention and Identifying Related Variables (Cook, 1979)
Although this study is almost twenty years old, it takes a unique approach to analyzing the
subject. This study used the Navy's Human Resource Management (HRM) and Navy
Aviation Career (NAC) surveys to attempt to predict naval aviator retention six to
eighteen months in the future. Through these surveys the author hoped to examine specific
variables that discriminate "careerists" from 'resignees" in order to gain a better
understanding of retention behavior and allow the Navy to develop effective action plans
aimed at solving aviator retention problems. Results from this study correctly classified
90% of the naval aviator sample into the two groups - careerist or resignee. It proved that
attitude measures concerning command climate and general satisfaction were found to be
highly correlated with personnel retention and that with the addition of several new items,
the HRM survey could effectively predict the retention behavior of aviators.
A problem with this approach was that it used 'stated career intentions" as the
dependent variable which may tend to bias the results more towards the 'politically
correct" responses of what their superiors "want to hear. " This problem could have been
eliminated entirely with a totally anonymous survey but, unfortunately, the surveys
contained social security numbers that were used to track the individuals longitudinally
throughout their careers. Although the results were not supposed to be seen by the
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immediate chain of command, there was probably still a slight bias in respondents'
candidness The study also discarded 'Undecided" individuals who may have provided
insight and variation into the overall results of the study. One interesting fact that was
presented was that at the time of the survey, 55% of the United States Naval Academy
(USNA) graduates were careerists while only 22% were resignees. Of aviators from the
Aviation Officer Candidate (AOC) program, the results were almost identical in that 55%
were careerists and 25% were resignees. This contradicted a previous study conducted by
Rickus, Booth and Ambler (1968) that had indicated that of USNA graduates, 70% were
careerists and of AOCs, 41% were careerists. This pattern also will be explored in this
thesis as commissioning source will be evaluated as to the effect it has on retention.
Another study that is as relevant today as it was almost twenty years ago is A
General Retention Model Applied to the Naval Aviator (O'Donnell, 1980). This study
presents both a general retention model and a specific model applicable to the naval
aviator that are based on various factors affecting job satisfaction. These factors are
derived from work attitudes and perceptions of an individual about an organization that
can influence the individual's decision to stay or leave. These factors in themselves may be
shaped by many other factors which may in turn influence turnover and retention. The
results of the model led the author to recommend actions that would satisfy the sociologist
Herzberg's 'hygiene factors" or Maslow's 'lower order needs" first before moving on to
more advanced needs. This approach can be restated in current terms by saying that it is
first and foremost important to satisfy "quality of life" issues when dealing with job
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satisfaction before moving on to higher level needs and non-hygiene factors. This appears
to be essentially RADM McGinn's approach to attacking the naval aviator retention
problem.
As previously discussed, many studies have attempted to quantify variables that
have a significant impact on aviator retention. One such study is A Statistical Analysis of
the Effects of Flight Time on Naval Aviator Retention (Lawry, 1993) This study
quantified the relationship between flight time and retention while controlling for the
effects of civilian airline pay and hiring levels as well as the effects of marital status,
children and race. Although Lawry' s a priori hypothesis was that aviators often leave due
to a lack of flight time, he found just the opposite: that retention was inversely related to
flight time in the jet and propeller aircraft communities. The effect of flight time for
helicopter pilots was not found to be statistically significant.
Lawry discounted the use of aviator survey data, probably because it is sometimes
difficult to quantify. He also discussed annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) models that
base the stay or leave decision on perceived future costs and benefits of each alternative.
They factor in monetary components incorporating total expected pay and benefits for
both military and civilian employment and account for a 'utility" function that measures
personal taste or distaste for military life. The specific model Lawry used included
variables such as flight time, average annual starting salary for major airlines (lagged one
year), number of pilots hired by the airlines (lagged one year), marital status, whether or
not the individual has children, and race.
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On a broader scale, some studies attempted to determine the effect of a wider
range of variables on retention. The Impact of the Military Drawdown on USN Aviator
Retention Rates (Turner, 1995) uses a unique database that takes grouped data defined by
year of commission, fiscal year, and aviator type and quantifies the relationships between
various downsizing policies and cohort continuation rates while controlling for the effects
of time-since-minimum service requirement (MSR) and civilian employment opportunities.
Turner's research examines downsizing policies such as VSI/SSB and involuntary
reduction in active duty (IRAD) programs that are intended to reduce retention rates
below what they normally would have been. These programs tend to distort the underlying
trend in "voluntary" retention that is of primary concern to decision makers.
Turner's study reveals that downsizing policies have had only a minor effect on the
underlying, baseline continuation rates. He did find that there was a statistically significant
positive relationship between an increase in the amount of ACP bonuses and the
continuation rate but the downsizing policies such as VSI/SSB and IRAD did not appear
to be statistically significant suggesting that the policies were not as effective as policy
makers had hoped. This type of analysis can be very useful to decision makers as they can
now quantify effects of various policies and target specific aspects of the policies to
increase or decrease desired retention rates. It also substantiated the recurring theory that
increases in monetary compensation do have a significant positive impact on aviator
retention rates.
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Because monetary compensation policies and programs have proven to be
successful in increasing retention, analysts have spent a great deal of time studying these
programs. One of the most significant of these programs is ACP In Implementation of the
ACP Program (Cymrot, 1989), the policy's history is traced to its beginnings In January
1989, ACP replaced the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) program as the
Navy's major compensation tool for retaining mid-grade aviators. ACIP is another tool
that is used that affects not just mid-grade, but all aviators The ACP program was created
in response to a critical shortage of Lieutenant Commanders to fill 'Category II" billets as
department heads or officers-in-charge in aviation squadrons The program was developed
in response to unusually high loss rates between the time aviators complete their active
duty service obligation (MSR) and the time they serve in a specific CAT II aviator billet.
The previous program, AOCP, had provided desired results by reducing shortages in the
past but program and budgetary limitations prevented the program from eliminating the
shortages in the current environment. To compensate for that inadequacy, in-depth
analysis was conducted to shape the size of the bonus as a function of the size of the
specific sub-community shortage. An implementation plan (as well as alternative plans)
was also devised to ensure the program was compatible with budgetary limitations. This
policy was successful to a certain extent, but appears to have rested on its laurels for too
long and has not changed with time or changes in related policies.
In 1997, a study was conducted to evaluate the status of the ACP program. ACP:
Should the Maximum Award Be Increased? (Moore, 1 997) evaluated the ACP program
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and to no one's surprise found the program to be outdated. The maximum bonus award
was not yielding desired increases in continuation rates in some aviation sub-communities
and planners were anticipating future shortfalls as the smaller "drawdown era" year groups
approached their MSRs. The actual value of the monetary reward for the ACP program
was found to be underestimated by 38 percent due to a combination of price inflation and
increases in service obligations for YG 87 and later.
Moore also analyzed the inadequacies of the ACIP program. For example, the
program was not structured to follow current career paths so that the higher amounts of
ACIP were paid solely to aviators at the end of their obligated service. Paying ACIP to
aviators not even eligible to leave the service did not meet the original purpose of the
program. Realizing this, the author concluded that the policy must change. Because she
could not resolve whether it was the additional obligated service or the devaluation of
ACP that matters to aviators, she chose to focus her study on what could be quantified.
The study calculates required bonus amounts to meet department head requirements over
the next few years and constructs an ACIP program that is compatible with current career
paths and resources available. This study is an excellent case of quantifying what needed
to be quantified but may have been more effective if it had resolved what was causing
aviators to leave the service.
The Navy is not the only service to actively study retention. All services are
equally concerned about protecting significant investments in human capital. The Marine
Corps has experienced many of the same problems in aviator retention that have been
33
discussed in this literature review. Aviator Retention in the Marine Corps (Kostiuk, 1989)
provides an analysis of factors affecting retention of Marine aviators from 1977 through
1988. These factors included military pay, civilian earnings, unemployment rates and
civilian hiring trends. The study examines estimates of the impact of these factors and how
they are used to predict the effect of changing policies on Marine aviator retention. It also
calculates the potential effects of changes in ACIP and ACP programs. The analysis was
conducted by creating a statistical model using retention rates for years 1977 through
1988 broken out by military occupation specialty (MOS), years of commissioned service
(YCS) and fiscal year as well as data on civilian employment opportunities, airline salaries
and annual hiring rates. The study found that airline hiring, unemployment rates and the
difference between military and civilian pay have a significant impact on retention. This
study is similar to the approach taken in this thesis.
All of these previous studies have provided insight into the variables that impact
aviator retention. Another important issue is how retention statistics are measured. A
report called Effectiveness of Alternative Officer Retention Measures Final Report
(Mackin, 1996) studied various retention measures. It explored the most appropriate
aggregate retention measures and the most effective way to provide and deliver retention
information to BUPERS analysts and decision makers. The study compares alternative
retention measures and evaluates their ability to predict officer retention patterns. The
alternative measures it uses are spot continuation rates, MSR survival rates, and
cumulative continuation rates. Each of these measures are calculated differently and are
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used in different situations so it is difficult to say which method is the 'best." Nonetheless,
analysts must be able to choose which method to use depending on their specific problem.
The method must be able to address the problem of eligibility to leave the service.
Currently there is no end-of-obligated-service (EAOS) date for officers and although
NPRDC developed an algorithm to predict this date, results of the calculations were less
than satisfactory for econometric estimation purposes largely due to data entry problems.
The only way to accurately determine whether an individual is under obligation is to
evaluate service records on a case by case basis, which is an extremely timely process.
Recommendations were made to include a data field in the officer master record (OMR)
that indicates specific EAOS as well as the necessary processing logic for assignment
officers to update the data as additional service is incurred. These recommendations would
greatly simplify the study of retention as analysts would have access to valuable
information that is currently relatively inaccessible.
Finally, the study of Naval Aviator Cohort Survival Rates: Progress and Next
Steps (Hogan, 1995) discusses progress made in separating the influence of policies
affecting observed retention from the voluntary decisions of aviators. These decisions
form the underlying voluntary survival rates that are of utmost concern to analysts. After
resolving this difference, the author suggests directions for improvement in the future.
Hogan examines MSR survival rates and cumulative continuation rates to create a simple
spreadsheet model for aviation officer community managers to estimate future
continuation rates as a function of military and civilian pay growth, ACP and VSI/SSB
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policies, MSR and years of service, and a catch-all category for miscellaneous factors
titled "other." This model is a valuable tool that planners should take advantage of in
predicting retention behavior. This thesis will attempt to build on that model and analyze
various institutional and non-institutional factors that may affect aviator retention.
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study uses a unique, pooled database created from various sources. The
primary source was the 1997 Officer Personnel Information System (OPIS) which is an
information summary system (ISS) for the Navy officer community managers and analysts.
OPIS contains valuable historical information on officers including inventories, losses,
promotions and retention arrayed by a variety of dimensions including designator, grade,
commissioning source and gender. This information was created in a summarized form
from Bureau of Navy Personnel Officer records through the Naval Personnel and
Research and Development Center's 'FAIM-O" system. The data is accessed by
Highlander™ data query software. Other sources of data for this study are the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Naval Personnel Aviation Community Manager's
office
In accessing the 1997 version of OPIS (OPIS97), the database of "All Navy Less
Warrants" was used because it included all commissioned U.S. Navy officers (less Warrant
Officers) through 1996. This data contained both the USN and USNR pilots (designated
13 IX) in every specific aviation sub-community. Within this subsystem, the 'Retention"
module was then used to extract continuation rate information for all pilots by year group,
commissioning source, and aviation qualification designation (AQD).
To determine the specific year group of pilots and group them by cohorts, the data
had to be manually manipulated by converting the 'Years of Service" (YOS) dimension
into a commissioning year cohort. Currently the YOS dimension allows the user to select
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any one combination of YOS from zero to 31 (where 31 denotes those with 30 or more)
years of service. The Highlander 7. 7™ software unfortunately does not allow the user to
simply query the system by cohort at this time. 2 This study analyzes the pilot cohorts from
YG84 through YG89 and their continuation rate behavior between 1990 and 1996.
The 'Source" dimension provides information regarding officer commissioning
source. This study focused on only three sources, which contain the majority of
commissioning sources for all pilots. The three groups studied were U.S. Naval Academy,
a combination of NROTC scholarship and college programs, and a combination of
Aviation Officer Candidate School (AOCS) and the Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate
(AVROC) programs. These three groups were separated to obtain variation in
continuation results by commissioning source. Although each commissioning source is
subject to a different initial MSR, after flight training, all pilots are grouped together and
subject to the same MSR obligations.
The 'Designator" dimension allows the user to access information regarding the
different aviation sub-communities. Table 4. 1 presents a list of the communities studied
and the platforms used in each.
2 Future releases of the software will allow the user to create "macros" or formulas








VAQ VAQ - EA6
vs VS-S3
VQJ VQ - ES3
FSJ FLEET SUPPORT - JET
JO JET - OTHER
TOTJ TOTAL - JET
VAW VAW - E2
VP VP-P3
VQP VQ - EP3
FSP FLEET SUPPORT - PROP
PO PROP - OTHER
TOTP TOTAL - PROP
HS2 HSL - SH2
HS6 HSL - SH60B
HS HS - H3/H60
FSH FLEET SUPPORT HELICOPTER
HCV HC - CH46
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HMV HM-MH53




Continuation rates for each sub-community, by commissioning source and year
group, were obtained for 1990 through 1996 and input into an EXCEL spreadsheet
database These continuation rates were computed as (1 -Strength loss rate') for each
given inventory at the beginning of a fiscal year. For example, suppose there were initially
one hundred pilots in a specific community and there were 20 strength losses during the
year. The continuation rate for that cell would be 80 percent (1 - 20/100). These Strength
losses" include reduction in active duty (RAD), resignations, retirements, reversion to
enlisted status, death, discharge, and miscellaneous categories. The continuation rates
used are summarized in the Appendix to this study and reflect similar results to Tables
2.1a through 2. If when examining the ALL AQD which represents the entire pilot
community.
The EXCEL spreadsheet into which the continuation rate data is input also
contains unemployment data, airline industry hiring data, a variable specifying the active
duty service obligation (ADSO) of each cohort, and a variable specifying whether or not
the specific sub-community or cohort was offered aviation continuation pay (ACP).
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Unemployment data was provided for the past ten years by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. This information is obtained from the Current Population Survey. The data are
seasonally adjusted and encompass the entire civilian labor force (16 years old and older).
Monthly unemployment rates were summed and averaged to derive an annual
unemployment rate. This annual unemployment rate was then matched to the years studied
in this analysis (1990 through 1996) and input into the newly created database. Table 4.2
presents a summary of the unemployment data used in this study.
Table 4.2
U.S. Unemployment Rate Data








Total "Air Transportation Industry" employee data for the past ten years were also
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This information was used because it most
closely approximates a similar civilian occupation for military pilots. That is not to say that
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all aviators who leave the service look only to the commercial airline industry for
employment, but it should be considered a viable option due to its similarity to military
aviation careers. The statistical data were summarized by month, in thousands of
employees in the entire industry. This provided a means to monitor growth in the industry
by observing increasing or decreasing total numbers of employees. Although only monthly
totals were provided, annual increases or decreases in the totals were derived by
subtracting the total number of employees in January of one year from the total number of
employees in January of the next year. In 1991, the total is negative which indicates a
downsizing in the industry for that year. Table 4.3 summarizes the air transportation
industry annual growth totals.
Table 4.3











The remaining data were obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Aviation
Officer Community Manager and from historical ACP qualification messages. A dummy
variable representing the active duty service obligation (ADSO) policy was created for
each cohort based on the ADSO policy associated with that particular year group and sub-
community. In 1984 through 1986, the ADSO for all pilots was five years from the date of
'Winging" or completion of flight training. In 1987, the ADSO increased to six years for
all pilots and in 1988, it increased to seven years for helicopter and propeller community
pilots and eight years for jet pilots. These increases in ADSO lengthen pilots' careers in
order to protect the Navy's investment in human capital made from flight training, but
they also cause continuation rates to sometimes misrepresent actual continuation behavior.
If a pilot is still serving under his ADSO, he is not eligible to leave the service and
therefore, voluntary continuation cannot be assumed. This database associates ADSOs
with their respective year groups and communities in an attempt to measure the impact
these policy changes have on continuation behavior. It also includes a variable to indicate
whether or not an individual is eligible to make the stay or leave decision by controlling
for the fact that he is still under an MSR/ADSO policy or not.
The next variables considered are dummy variables representing ACP eligibility.
ACP policies are targeted to specific sub-communities and year groups to ensure there are
enough officers to adequately fill department head billets. Acceptance of ACP obligates
these officers through their fourteenth year of service in return for monetary
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compensation. Although traditionally not all pilots in each targeted sub-community receive
ACP, they are all technically eligible to request it. In some cases a review board is held to
determine the 'hiost qualified" individuals within that sub-community so that budgetary
limitations will be satisfied. In other cases, individuals simply do not accept the ACP
offered because the compensation benefits do not outweigh the psychological or economic
costs associated with being obligated for an extended time period. This database classified
those particular sub-communities and year groups as "eligible" or 'hot eligible" for ACP in
order to determine whether or not the specific ACP policies implemented between 1990
and 1996 have a significant effect on continuation rates.
Dummy variables were also created for each general sub-community (jet, propeller
and helicopter) to control for the differences in continuation behavior between the
different aircraft type pilots. Ideally, a study should consider the continuation behavior at
the specific sub-community level but due to limitations of this model and problems
associated with multicollinearity, this was not possible.
Methodology
The relationship between various institutional and non-institutional factors on
aviator cohort continuation rates is specified by the following multivariate linear
regression model:
CR = BO + BlUNEMP + B2HIRES(t-J) + B3BONUS + B4JET+ B5PROP +
B6HELO + B1ADS05 + BZADS06 + B9ADS07 + B10ADSO8 + B11MSK + U
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where CR is the continuation rate for cells representing a specific AQD, year group and
commissioning source. BO is the intercept term and B 1 - 1 1 represent the coefficients of
the variables in the equation to be estimated. The equation is estimated using ordinary
least squares. The independent variables are defined as follows:
1 . UNEMP is the annual unemployment rate associated with the fiscal year being
studied.
2 . HIRES(t-l) is the growth in the air transportation industry, lagged by one
year. It is lagged because that is the time frame during which aviators are
making their stay or leave decision regarding their careers.
3 . BONUS is a dummy variable representing the specific policies implemented
between 1991 and 1996. It denotes whether or not a cohort with a given AQD
was offered aviation continuation pay ( 1 =yes, 0=no) in a given fiscal year.
4 . JET, PROP and HELO are dummy variables representing the three general
aircraft type pilots (l=yes, 0=no). Because every individual must be included in
one of these three categories, one must be omitted from the model to
determine the relative effectiveness controlling for aircraft type has on
continuation rate behavior. The PROP category was arbitrarily omitted from
this model and referenced as the "base case" for aircraft type.
5
.
ADS05 through ADS08 are dummy variables representing the active duty
service obligation policy (five through eight years from date of winging)
associated with each particular cohort studied (l=yes, 0=no). For example, an
45
ADS05 variable coded "1 " indicates that that particular cohort has a five-year
obligation from the date of winging. Because every individual must be subject
to one of these ADSOs in the model, one ADSO variable is omitted to
determine the relative effects of the different policies. During each model run,
the ADS05 variable was omitted and the remaining ADSOs referenced from
that variable For models involving jet pilots, the ADS07 variable was also
omitted because jet pilots were never subject to a seven-year obligated service
commitment Likewise, the ADS08 variable was omitted from the models
involving helicopter and propeller pilots because they were never subject to an
eight-year obligation.
6 . MSR is a dummy variable created to indicate whether or not an individual is
eligible to leave the service or not (l=yes, 0=no) in a given fiscal year. For
example, ifMSR=l, that particular individual is eligible to leave the service.
7 . The error term is represented by U.
Table 4.4 provides a sample of the arithmetic means of each variable. It also
provides the number of observations (N) of each variable and the standard deviations




Variable N Means Standard Deviation
CR 3150 90.9712142 16.5730410
UNEMP 3150 6.2814286 0.7443230
HIRES 3150 29.9009524 30.0892876
B0NUS91 3150 0.0800000 0.2713363
BONUS92 3150 0.12000000 0.3250131
BONUS93 3150 0.0933333 0.2909452
BONUS94 3150 0.044444 0.2061131
BONUS95 3150 0.0288889 0.1675208
BONUS96 3150 0.0777778 0.2678641
ADS05 3066 0.5136986 0.4998938
ADS06 3066 0.1712329 0.3767738
ADS07 3066 0.1780822 0.3826443
ADS08 3066 0.1369863 0.3438890
JET 3150 0.3600000 0.4800762
PROP 3150 0.1600000 0.3666643
HELO 3150 0.2800000 0.4490702
MSR 3150 0.6666667 0.4714794
The expected or hypothesized relationship between the independent variables and
the continuation rate is as follows:
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1 . UNEMP is hypothesized to have a positive effect on continuation rates. As
total civilian unemployment rates increase, continuation rates should increase
as more pilots stay in the military due to the lack of available civilian job
opportunities. This non-institutional factor is included because it is
theoretically relevant to the entire pilot community.
2 . HIRES is a non-institutional factor hypothesized to have an inverse
relationship with continuation rates As the growth rate of the air
transportation industry increases, the Navy pilot community should decrease as
officers leave the service to seek civilian employment.
3 . The BONUS policies are institutional factors hypothesized to have a positive
impact on continuation rates. As monetary compensation is offered to pilots to
remain in the service, the gap between civilian and military earnings will
become smaller causing military pilots to be more satisfied with their current
status.
4 . The general aircraft type variables represent institutional factors that are
hypothesized to affect continuation rates due to different opportunities for
employment in the civilian sector.
5 . All of the ADSO variables are institutional factors hypothesized to have a
positive impact on continuation rates because the policies enacted will increase
the amount of time obligated from flight training. If the individual is not eligible
to leave the service, continuation rates should increase.
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6 . The MSR variable is hypothesized to have a significantly negative effect on
continuation rate behavior If more officers are eligible to leave the service,
continuation rates should decrease significantly.
Because the MSR and ADSO variables are similar in measuring service obligations,
the model must be executed twice; once with the MSR variable included and the ADSO
variables omitted and once with the MSR variable omitted and the ADSO variables
included. This eliminates the problem of bias in the estimators because they are both
theoretically measuring different aspects of the same factor - - being under a service
obligation.
The model is also executed with the effect of eligibility to leave the service
accounted for. This allows us to examine the true effects of these variables on the




Results of estimating OLS models are presented in Tables 5.1 through 5.3. These
tables include the parameter estimate, standard error, and a t-value for the null hypothesis
(t-value for HO). They also include measures of effectiveness for the model including R2
and F-value. The model R2 measures the goodness-of-fit of the regression model by
measuring the proportion of the total variation in dependent variable (CR) explained by
the regression model. All of the models reveal a relatively low R2 which is due to the fact
that the model probably suffers from some degree of specification bias in that it has
omitted some significant factors that determine retention behavior. Some of these factors
are omitted because of the difficulty in quantifying certain variables such as "quality of
life" concerns. The F-value of the model is a measure of the overall significance of the
estimated regression. It tests the null hypothesis (HO) that each of the estimated
coefficients are jointly equal to zero (Turner, 1995). For all of the models, the calculated
F-value is statistically significant with a 99 percent confidence interval. This allows us to
reject the null hypothesis and accept the fact that the estimated coefficients do not jointly
equal zero, leading us to believe that despite the low R2 values, the models are effective in
explaining the variation in continuation rates.
The parameter estimates for the UNEMP, HIRES, BONUS and aircraft type are
included in both tables. Based on the a priori hypothesized effects of each explanatory
variable, a one-tail test of statistical significance is used to test the significance of the
regression coefficients (Gujarati, 1995). A single asterisk (*) in the 'PROB > | T | "column
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indicates statistical significance at a minimum of 90 percent. Two asterisks (**) indicate
statistical significance at a 95 percent confidence interval. Three asterisks (***) indicate
statistical significance at a 99 percent confidence interval, which is the highest level of
significance observed. The absence of an asterisk indicates that the result was not
statistically significant at any of the levels tested
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Table 5.1
OLS Results Including the MSR Variable (Excluding ADSO)







PROB > | T |
INTERCEPT 88.888139 4.30372476 20.654 0.0001
UNEMP 0.594842 0.61881673 0.961 0.3365
HIRES -0.003454 0.01530122 -0.226 0.8214
BONUS -5.845889 1.23877721 -4.719 0.0001***
JET 2.556968 0.69390039 3.685 0.0002***
HELO 5.356146 0.72813617 7.356 0.0001***
MSR -5.398758 0.62216549 -8.677 0.0001***
IT = 0.0507
Sample Size (N) = 3150
F-Value = 27.994***
Table 5.2
OLS Results Including ADSO (Excluding MSR)








INTERCEPT 83.240413 4.35522786 19.113 0.0001
UNEMP 0.531436 0.62853207 0.846 0.3979
HIRES -0.003904 0.01554146 -0.251 0.8017
BONUS -5.025818 1.26043478 -3.987 0.0001***
ADS06 2.941810 0.82265887 3.576 0.0004***
ADS07 4.673808 0.85306858 5.479 0.0001***
ADS08 7.730814 0.99688916 7.755 0.0001***
JET 1.848047 0.79404477 2.327 0.0200**
HELO 5.721704 0.74692130 7.660 0.0001***
R2 = 0.0563












INTERCEPT 97.735740 5.93763302 16.460 0.0001
UNEMP -1.567020 0.85891942 -1.824 0.0682*
HIRES -0.035109 0.02123562 -1.653 0.0984*
BONUS -5.379433 1.41886936 -3.791 0.0002***
JET 2.343224 0.96923744 2.418 0.0157**
HELO 6.466380 1.00709885 6421 0.0001***
R/ = 0.0268
Sample Size (N) = 2100
F-Value= 11.537***
As in Kostiuk's study of Aviator Retention in the Marine Corps (Kostiuk, 1989),
the analysis of the statistical model shows that the impact of a change in a variable
depends on the estimated parameter coefficient, the starting level continuation rate, and
the size of the change in the variable. For a given change in the variable and a constant
coefficient, the change in retention will be greater the closer the continuation rate is to 0.5.
As continuation rates increase, the impact of any variable change diminishes. Kostiuk uses
the example of expecting a change in pay to be less when continuation rates are already
high because there are fewer people to be persuaded to stay by the increase in pay. This
example can be applied to these models in that, on the whole, because the continuation
rates used in this study are relatively high, we can expect the effects of different variables
may be less than originally hypothesized. We can also expect more significant results to be
produced by the model examining only those eligible to leave the service than those
incorporating all pilots, regardless of their eligibility status.
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A. UNEMPLOYMENT
The unemployment variable is not a statistically significant factor in explaining
continuation rates for pilots unless the 'eligibility problem" is resolved. When the model
was executed for only those individuals eligible to leave the service, the resultant estimate
was statistically significant with a 90 percent confidence interval. Although the relationship
is not statistically significant for all pilots, regardless of eligibility, it is positive indicating
that as the total unemployment rate increases, pilots are more likely to remain in the
service, which is the hypothesized direction. For those eligible to leave the service, the
relationship is inverse in that an increase in unemployment decreases continuation rates.
This contradicts the original hypothesis, but may be attributable to the fact that the pilot
community represents such a relatively small segment of total employment opportunities
and their behavior is not representative of society on the whole. One possible problem
with this variable is its highly aggregated nature. UNEMP only varies across years. This
lack of variation may explain its poor performance.
B. AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY HIRES
For the air transportation industry hires variable, the estimates are again not
statistically significant at any confidence interval unless controlling for the eligibility
problem. When the model is executed for only those eligible to leave the service, the
relationship is significant with a 90 percent confidence interval. The relationship that exists
is in all models inverse in that a decrease in air transportation industry hiring rates induces
a slight increase in continuation rates. This supports the original hypothesis that the
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growth of the industry should produce decreased continuation rates. Unfortunately, the
same problem of aggregation level affects HIRES that affects UNEMP which leads to a
probable bias in the estimates.
C. BONUS
The BONUS variable provides unexpected results. Statistically significant results
are obtained in each model with a 99 percent confidence interval. This result reveals an
inverse relationship between continuation rates and ACP policies which indicates that an
increase in the possibility of a bonus being offered decreases continuation rates. Although
specification bias was previously discussed, this result remains counter-intuitive. One
would hypothesize that an increase in bonus availability would lead to higher rather than
lower continuation rates. This opposite result may be attributable to the fact that bonuses
are targeted at sub-communities with predicted retention problems. This causes a
simultaneity bias in the estimate as it is attempting to predict the effect the bonus has while
simultaneously solving the retention problem. To compensate for this bias, a Two-Stage
Least Squares model was constructed where in the first stage, BONUS is estimated as a
function of all exogenous variables analyzed {UNEMP, HIRES, JET, PROP, and HEW).
In the second stage, the dependent variable is estimated as a function of the BONUS
estimate from the first stage. The advantage of this method is that it eliminates the
simultaneity bias in the coefficient of the bonus. Tables 5.4 through 5.6 present the results
of this model. In the second stage results we can now see that the effect of the bonus on
retention is now positive, although it is not statistically significant. Table 5.7 presents the
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Table 5.4
Two-Stage Least Squares - First Stage Results








INTERCEPT 100.778689 5.956507 16.919 0.0001
UNEMP -1.761739 0.856764 -2.056 0.0399**
HIRES -0.031182 0.021195 -1.471 0.1414
JET -0.597162 1.107923 -0.539 0.5899
PROP -4.502519 1.332472 -3.379 0.0007***
HELO 4.071867 1.163077 3.501 0.0005***
R2 - 0.0254
Sample Size (N) = 2100
F-Value = 10.927***
Table 5.5
Two-Stage Least Squares - First Stage Results








INTERCEPT -0.205574 0.091638 -2.243 0.0250
UNEMP 0.036197 0.013181 2.746 0.0061***
HIRES -0.000730 0.000326 -2.239 0.0253**
JET 0.186508 0.017045 10.942 0.0001***
PROP 0.026786 0.020499 1.307 0.1915
HELO 0.085034 0.017893 4.752 0.0001***
R2 = 0.0897
Sample Size (N) = 2100
F-Value = 41.244***
Table 5.6
Two-Stage Least Squares - Second Stage Results








INTERCEPT 88.979000 0.593413 149.944 0.0001
BONUS 0.075556 4.578904 0.017 0.9868
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Table 5.7
Two-Stage Least Squares - First Stage Results








INTERCEPT 101.339754 6.033392 16.796 0.0001
BONUS 3.229439 5.403111 0.598 0.5501
UNEMP -1.878636 0.893042 -2.104 0.0355**
HIRES -0.028824 0.021914 -1.315 0.1885
R2 = 0.0021
Sample Size (N) = 2100
F-Value = 1.494
results of the model when using JET, PROP, and HELO to identify BONUS. This
suggests that simultaneity bias is a problem and that more variables are required to
properly identify the model.
Another possible explanation for these unexpected results is related to the fact that
the intent of the bonus program is to compensate for low retention by offering monetary
incentives to remain in the service. The monetary compensation associated with the ACP
policies had not been updated since 1989 and has thus become undervalued by
approximately 38 percent (Moore, 1997) Recently the compensation has been increased
to a maximum of $25,000 to rectify this matter. In this analysis, results may indicate that
previous policies have not been as successful as hoped. However, note that this variable is
also highly aggregated and subject to different types of bias. The BONUS variable equals
T'for the entire fiscal year during which a bonus may have been available to a targeted
community. This indicates that every pilot in that year group was technically eligible for
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ACP while only a select few individuals may have accepted it. Because of this, these
preliminary results must be viewed as inconclusive in actually estimating the true impact of
ACP on retention. Factoring in the simultaneity bias that precludes discerning the true
impact of the variable on continuation rates with the quality of the data forces us to
examine this estimate with skepticism.
D. ADS06
The ADS06 policy variable is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
interval when referenced to the ADS05 policy variable. The relationship between this
estimate and continuation rates is positive, corresponding with the original hypothesis that
the variable would have a positive effect on pilot continuation rates.
E. ADS07
This policy variable also reveals statistically significant results at a 99 percent
confidence interval. The estimate reveals a positive relationship between continuation rates
and the policy enacted in 1987 of increasing the ADSO from six to seven years for
helicopter and propeller pilots. This reaffirms the initial hypothesis that increasing required
obligated service would serve to increase continuation rates.
F. ADS08
Like the ADS06 and ADSO 7 variables, this policy variable provides a statistically
significant parameter estimate. This estimate is also positive indicating that the increase in
obligated service has a positive effect on increasing continuation rates for jet pilots
because they were the only pilots subject to this policy.
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G. JET, PROP AND HELO
The specific aircraft type variables reveal statistically significant estimates at a 99
percent confidence interval when controlling for MSR and not including the ADSO
variables. When the ADSO variables are included, there is still a significant relationship
between aircraft type and continuation rates but for the JET community that confidence
interval is reduced to 95 percent, as compared to the PROP community. These estimates
are nonetheless positive in both models, indicating that the specific community origin
positively impacts continuation rate behavior, although more so for helicopter pilots than
for jet pilots when referenced to propeller pilots.
H. MSR
The MSR coefficient indicates that whether or not an individual is eligible to make
the stay or leave decision is statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence interval. This
relationship is inverse, confirming the original hypothesis that continuation rates should
decrease once an individual is no longer subject to any form of obligated service and is
eligible to leave the service. When the model is executed for only those individuals eligible
to leave the service, each variable reveals statistically significant estimates for every
variable. This
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis examines the relationship between various institutional and non-
institutional factors that affect Naval aviator retention and the continuation rates of pilots
in year groups 1984 through 1989. A unique, pooled database was created that will allow
future analysts to further study aviator retention rates. The specific factors analyzed are
unemployment rates, air transportation industry hiring data, ACP policies implemented
between 1991 and 1996, and various MSR policies affecting pilots' active duty service
obligation. The continuation rates, computed by sub-community, year group and
commissioning source, are examined for 1990 through 1996 to determine the effect of
various factors on the retention behavior of pilots.
The analysis found a statistically significant relationship between the offering of a
bonus and continuation rates. Unfortunately this analysis must be viewed with skepticism
due to significant problems with the model and data specification. The relationship
revealed is inverse in that the offering of a bonus is associated with lower pilot
continuation rates. This is difficult to accept as true due to the intuitive theory that if we
pay someone enough money, they will remain in the service. The results obtained may be
correlated to the fact that bonuses are targeted towards communities with historically
unsatisfactory continuation rates and to problems associated with the statistical analysis
previously discussed. A possible inference from this result, if it were true, is that bonuses
are currently being offered to individuals who would most likely remain in the service
without a bonus or that the bonus is not a significant enough factor alone to affect
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individuals considering whether or not to leave the service. From these results however,
we can not conclude with any degree of confidence that the ACP structure pertaining to
this study was relatively effective or ineffective in impacting continuation rates. It is
important to note that the ACP program has recently been updated by increasing the
monetary compensation available to eligible aviators. This change may remedy some of the
ineffectiveness of the prior program and actually serve to increase continuation rates, thus
satisfying the intent of the program. Previous studies have proven the effectiveness of
incentive programs in increasing retention. Considering the updated ACP program and
resolving problems with the statistical analysis should allow analysts to refine their studies
of continuation behavior and determine the true impact bonuses have on retention.
Both the unemployment and air transportation industry hiring rates provide
statistical significance in explaining pilot continuation rates only when examining the pilots
eligible to leave the service. These variables reveal negative relationships with continuation
rates indicating that an increase in unemployment rates and airline hiring rates actually
decreases continuation rate behavior. Prior studies, including Kostiuk's Marine Corps
study, have indicated that unemployment and civilian airline hiring have had significant
effects on aviator retention. The differences in this study and those prior studies is most
likely attributable to the fact that as continuation rates increase, the impact of any variable
change diminishes. The continuation rates used were generally high, which leads us to
expect these variables to exhibit less of an effect on continuation rates than intuitively
expected. The unexpectedly negative relationship between continuation rates and
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unemployment rates may be attributed to the relative insignificance the pilot community
has in impacting total unemployment rates. This possibility should be examined in future
studies.
The lack of statistical significance for the unemployment and air transportation
industry hires estimates when not isolating the model to include only those eligible to
leave indicates that these variables have no significant impact on overall pilot continuation
rates unless they are eligible to leave. This supports that aviators are relatively insensitive
to changes in the non-institutional environment affecting them, and rejects the theory that
aviators are more likely to leave the service when the airline industry is hiring pilots at
increased rates. This result is probably due to the fact that only a relatively small
percentage of aviators leaving the service actually seek employment in the airline industry
and the data used in this study is of a highly aggregated nature leading to possible bias in
the statistical analysis.
Results from the analysis of changing ADSO policies support the original
hypothesis that increasing obligated service commitments will tend to increase
continuation rates. The increase of obligated service lengths from five to six, seven and
eight years has become more statistically significant as the length of service increases.
Referenced to the five-year ADSO policy, the six-year ADSO policy implemented in 1987
and the seven and eight-year ADSO policy implemented in 1988 for all pilots are all
statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence interval indicating that the policies have
been effective in increasing desired continuation rates.
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The MSR variable estimate also confirms that individuals eligible to leave the
service are much more likely to leave than those not eligible. The estimate is negative and
statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence interval proving the original hypothesis
and indirectly reaffirming the fact that MSR policies do effectively induce higher
continuation rates.
These results may be considered trivial because the individuals concerned are
legally bound to stay in the service therefore revealing significant effects. Restricting the
model to study only those eligible to leave eliminates some of the bias and allows analysts
to focus their study on true continuation rate behavior. The results from the model
examining only the individuals eligible to leave reaffirms this point by revealing more
statistically significant results than the models not controlling for the eligibility problem.
Summary and Recommendations
This study suggests that the institutional factors analyzed have had a greater
impact on Naval aviator continuation rates than the non-institutional factors. Increases in
obligated service requirements have probably caused continuation rates to be unexpectedly
high as individuals are not eligible to make a stay or leave decision until later in their
careers. There is also a bias evident in this study due to the fact that the data file is based
on pooled, aggregate data and cannot be applied to every individual. This problem could
be rectified by including a reliable variable in the Officer Master File that would allow
analysts to monitor and examine eligibility and predict retention behavior on an individual
basis. Once this eligibility problem is resolved on an individual level and the aggregation
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bias is reduced, a clearer understanding of factors affecting aviator retention will be
possible. On an individual level, the specific reasons for leaving the service could also be
analyzed. Currently the database does not discriminate between various reasons for
leaving the service, it only considers overall Strength losses" With a greater
understanding of the reasons for leaving the service, analysts will be better able to predict
retention behavior. Until then, decision makers should continue to exercise their influence
in the form of policy guidance to ensure adequate retention rates are maintained and the
investment in human capital made to train pilots is protected.
With regard to the ACP program, inadequacies of this study have been addressed
and future studies should examine the impact of the revised program on pilot retention to
determine its effectiveness.
Future studies should also examine the impact of military-civilian pay differentials
as possible causes for retention behavior to increase or decrease. An annualized cost of
leaving (ACOL) model could be used to measure the perceived and actual differences in
earnings between the civilian and military pay structures. The earnings figures would have
to be annualized or summarized to include expected future earnings because if only
starting salaries are considered, results would lead analysts to conclude that the lower
salaries in the airline industry may actually induce lower continuation rates. This is due to
the fact that historically, military pilots would be forced to accept a reduction in earnings if
hired by the airline industry. Once the future earnings (which traditionally have been
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significantly higher for the civilian sector) are factored in, the results would become much
more intuitively believable.
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APPENDIX: CONTINUATION RATE DATA
AQD COMM YG CR90 CR91 CR92 CR93 CR94 CR95 CR96
VQJ USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ AOCS 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ AOCS 87 100 100 100 75 66.66667 100
VQJ USNA 86 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ NROTC 86 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ AOCS 86 100 75 66.66667 100 50 100
VQJ USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ NROTC 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ AOCS 85 33.33333 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ NROTC 84 50 100 100 100 100 100
VQJ AOCS 84 50 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 50
FSJ AOCS 88 100 100 100 100 85.71429 72.72727 42.85714
FSJ USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ AOCS 87 100 90 87.5 85.71429 50 81.81818 90
FSJ USNA 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ NROTC 86 100 100 100 66.66667 50 100 66.66667
FSJ AOCS 86 100 100 66.66667 100 100 85.71429 88.88889
FSJ USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ NROTC 85 66.66667 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ AOCS 85 50 100 100 100 50 100
FSJ USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ NROTC 84 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSJ AOCS 84 62.5 60 100 100 33.33333 85.71429 83.33333
JO USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 75
JO NROTC 89 100 100 75 100 100 100 100
JO AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 80 25
JO USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 66.66667
JO NROTC 88 100 100 100 83.33333 100 66.66667 100
JO AOCS 88 100 96.77419 100 100 85.71429 75 100
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JO USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
JO NROTC 87 100 100 88.88889 100 100 83.33333 100
JO AOCS 87 97.61905 100 88.23529 70 100 66.66667 100
JO USNA 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
JO NROTC 86 100 100 50 100 100 100 50
JO AOCS 86 100 100 100 75 66.66667 100 100
JO USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100
JO NROTC 85 100 75 100 100 100 100
JO AOCS 85 66.66667 100 100 100 100 100 100
JO USNA 84 100 100 50 100 100 100 100
JO NROTC 84 100 100 100 50 100 100
JO AOCS 84 50 100 100 100 100 100
TOTJ USNA 89 100 100 100 94.73684 98.14815 100 91.83673
TOTJ NROTC 89 100 100 96 100 100 95.06173 100
TOTJ AOCS 89 100 98.30508 100 95.16129 86.44068 92.30769 78.7234
TOTJ USNA 88 100 100 100 97.33333 97.26027 92.95775 91 .04478
TOTJ NROTC 88 100 96.38554 100 97.77778 97.77778 94.25287 88.09524
TOTJ AOCS 88 99.41176 96.42857 97.53086 89.30818 92.14286 83.07692 76.14679
TOTJ USNA 87 100 100 95.58824 95.3125 95.16129 79.66102 93.02326
TOTJ NROTC 87 98.8764 97.70115 98.83721 95.34884 87.95181 86.11111 77.41935
TOTJ AOCS 87 99.17012 97.09544 92.85714 90.90909 79 74.07407 81.35593
TOTJ USNA 86 100 96.8254 93.65079 92.1875 83.33333 84 80.95238
TOTJ NROTC 86 98.24561 96.42857 83.92857 94.33962 71.15385 87.17949 75.75758
TOTJ AOCS 86 98.64253 86.87783 76.26263 91.33333 79.56204 85.04673 86.02151
TOTJ USNA 85 98.11321 80.76923 74.4186 97.14286 82.35294 92.85714 87.5
TOTJ NROTC 85 92.85714 87.17949 88.88889 87.87879 93.54839 100 65.38462
TOTJ AOCS 85 82.19178 71.18644 78.57143 88.23529 90 78.57143 86.95652
TOTJ USNA 84 91 .83673 80.43478 79.48718 93.54839 96.55172 85.18519 100
TOTJ NROTC 84 71.11111 66.66667 72.72727 87.5 71.42857 88.88889 100
TOTJ AOCS 84 68.18182 62.13592 76.1194 97.95918 91.48936 91.83673 93.18182
VAW USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 85.71429
VAW NROTC 89 100 100 87.5 90.90909 100 100 100
VAW AOCS 89 100 100 93.33333 72.72727 100 87.5 100
VAW USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 87.5 71.42857
VAW NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 90.90909
VAW AOCS 88 100 100 93.75 91 .66667 83.33333 90.90909 100
VAW USNA 87 100 100 100 100 66.66667 100 100
VAW NROTC 87 100 100 100 90 77.77778 83.33333 60
VAW AOCS 87 100 94.33962 82.35294 96.77419 77.41935 76 94.44444
VAW USNA 86 100 100 100 100 66.66667 100 100
VAW NROTC 86 100 80 80 100 66.66667 100 50
VAW AOCS 86 100 79.16667 81.25 100 69.23077 90.90909 100
VAW USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 33.33333
VAW NROTC 85 100 75 100 100 100 100 50
VAW AOCS 85 66.66667 100 100 100 100 100
VAW USNA 84 100 100 66.66667 100 100 100 100
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VAW NROTC 84 85.71429 50 50 100 100 100 100
VAW AOCS 84 65 75 100 100 87.5 71 .42857 80
VP USNA 89 100 97.5 100 97.72727 97.72727 83.72093 69.44444
VP NROTC 89 100 98.75 98.75 95.12195 97.4359 90.78947 74.28571
VP AOCS 89 100 96.42857 96.2963 92.59259 92.30769 86.36364 84.21053
VP USNA 88 100 97.61905 97.56098 100 92.68293 66.66667 74.07407
VP NROTC 88 100 96.25 93.58974 97.53086 91.13924 72.22222 80.39216
VP AOCS 88 100 90.58824 93.50649 91 .66667 72.30769 70 76.66667
VP USNA 87 100 93.75 93.18182 95.12195 66.66667 80.76923 75
VP NROTC 87 100 96.72131 100 90.16393 78.18182 72.09302 90.32258
VP AOCS 87 100 89.16667 85.84906 69.56522 50.79365 80 85.18519
VP USNA 86 97.22222 100 94.44444 77.14286 69.23077 94.11765 81.25
VP NROTC 86 100 93.18182 82.92683 52.94118 83.33333 86.66667 91 .66667
VP AOCS 86 99.18033 67.5 74.39024 50 68.96552 100 94.73684
VP USNA 85 100 74.35897 67.85714 94.73684 88.88889 80 81.81818
VP NROTC 85 92.5 60.52632 73.91304 76.47059 92.30769 75 55.55556
VP AOCS 85 80.88235 59.25926 65.625 94.73684 88.23529 86.66667 100
VP USNA 84 78.7234 63.15789 62.5 93.33333 92.30769 81.81818 100
VP NROTC 84 78.125 40 66.66667 100 83.33333 60 100
VP AOCS 84 71.62162 50.9434 74.07407 94.73684 77.77778 85.71429 100
VQP USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 83.33333 80
VQP NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 83.33333 100 75
VQP AOCS 89 100 100 100 88.88889 77.77778 100 100
VQP USNA 88 100 75 100 100 100 66.66667 50
VQP NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 91 .66667 72.72727
VQP AOCS 88 94.11765 94.44444 88.23529 78.57143 80 55.55556 100
VQP USNA 87 100 100 100 100 50 50 100
VQP NROTC 87 100 85.71429 100 87.5 85.71429 83.33333 72.72727
VQP AOCS 87 100 88.23529 65.51724 84.21053 64.70588 100 100
VQP USNA 86 100 71 .42857 100 100 100 75 66.66667
VQP NROTC 86 100 80 87.5 75 83.33333 100 100
VQP AOCS 86 84.21053 25 60 75 75 100 100
VQP USNA 85 50 50 50 100 100 100 100
VQP NROTC 85 33.33333 100 100 100 100
VQP AOCS 85 37.5 25 100 100 100 100
VQP USNA 84 57.14286 80 66.66667 100 100 100 100
VQP NROTC 84 50 100 100 66.66667 66.66667 100 100
VQP AOCS 84 50 66.66667 100 100 66.66667 100 100
FSP USNA 89 100 100 100 100 87.5 100 100
FSP NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 80 80 75
FSP AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 88.88889 87.5 85.71427
FSP USNA 88 100 100 75 100 100 100
FSP NROTC 88 100 100 83.33333 100 66.66667 60 66.66667
FSP AOCS 88 100 100 100 100 71 .42857 33.33333
FSP USNA 87 100 100 80 66.66667 100 100
FSP NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 33.33333 100 100
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FSP AOCS 87 100 93.75 75.75758 68 56.25 100 70
FSP USNA 86 100 100 100 66.66667 100 100 50
FSP NROTC 86 100 80 85.71429 50 100 50 100
FSP AOCS 86 91 .66667 27.27273 16.66667 100 100 100 66.66667
FSP USNA 85 100 25 100 100 100 100 50
FSP NROTC 85 100 25 100 100 100 100
FSP AOCS 85 62.5 40 100 66.66667 100 50 100
FSP USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSP NROTC 84 60 100 100 100 100 100
FSP AOCS 84 30.76923 25 100 100 100 100
PO USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 50 100
PO USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO NROTC 88 100 100 100 85.71429 83.33333 66.66667 100
PO AOCS 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO AOCS 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO USNA 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO NROTC 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 66.66667
PO AOCS 86 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO NROTC 85 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO AOCS 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO NROTC 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PO AOCS 84 100 100 100 100 100 100
TOTP USNA 89 100 98.36066 100 98.48485 96.9697 87.5 76.78571
TOTP NROTC 89 100 99.0566 97.14286 95.2381 95.9596 91.57895 77.27273
TOTP AOCS 89 100 98.33333 96.55172 89.65517 91.07143 86.66667 89.18919
TOTP USNA 88 100 96.66667 96.49123 100 94.64286 66.66667 72.97297
TOTP NROTC 88 100 97.3913 94.73684 97.4359 90.51724 76.41509 81.25
TOTP AOCS 88 99.19355 92.74194 93.04348 90.82569 74.73684 69.23077 81.25
TOTP USNA 87 100 95.08197 92.98246 92.45283 65.30612 78.125 72
TOTP NROTC 87 100 96.25 100 90.36145 77.02703 75 87.80488
TOTP AOCS 87 100 90.58296 80.69307 76.19048 59.84252 82.35294 86.44068
TOTP USNA 86 97.82609 95.74468 95.55556 80.85106 76.92308 89.65517 76.92308
TOTP NROTC 86 100 88.4058 83.60656 58.82353 83.87097 86.95652 85.71429
TOTP AOCS 86 96.62921 62.5731 71.55963 60.49383 70.83333 97.14286 93.93939
TOTP USNA 85 96.15385 72 72.22222 96.15385 91 .66667 85.71429 72.22222
TOTP NROTC 85 90.56604 58.33333 74.07407 80 88.23529 70.58824 61.53846
TOTP AOCS 85 75 56.92308 70.27027 92 86.36364 83.33333 93.33333
TOTP USNA 84 77.9661 68.75 61 .29032 94.44444 93.75 85.71429 100
TOTP NROTC 84 75 43.24324 68.75 90.90909 81.81818 77.77778 100
TOTP AOCS 84 64.03509 54.16667 81.08108 96.66667 80 78.26087 94.44444
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HS2 USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 88.23529 100
HS2 NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 90.32258 100 88.46154
HS2 AOCS 89 92.30769 100 100 84.21053 94.11765 93.33333 84.61538
HS2 USNA 88 100 100 100 100 93.33333 69.23077 77.77778
HS2 NROTC 88 100 100 90 100 100 100 100
HS2 AOCS 88 100 97.67442 95.2381 100 82.05128 77.41935 86.95652
HS2 USNA 87 100 100 100 100 66.66667 100 100
HS2 NROTC 87 100 95.65217 100 91 .66667 82.35294 91.66667 100
HS2 AOCS 87 98.18182 98.18182 94.33962 86.27451 62.5 78.94737 100
HS2 USNA 86 100 94.11765 75 90.90909 100 100 75
HS2 NROTC 86 100 100 86.66667 85.71429 100 88.88889 71 .42857
HS2 AOCS 86 100 96.77419 75.86207 86.36364 83.33333 100 75
HS2 USNA 85 100 88.88889 71 .42857 100 100 66.66667 100
HS2 NROTC 85 100 100 90 100 100 100 80
HS2 AOCS 85 100 84.61538 81.81818 100 100 66.66667 100
HS2 USNA 84 90 77.77778 100 100 100 50 100
HS2 NROTC 84 100 87.5 100 100 100 50 100
HS2 AOCS 84 81.25 69.23077 100 100 75 66.66667 100
HS6 USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 86.95652 95
HS6 NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 96.92308 98.4127 88.70968
HS6 AOCS 89 100 100 93.33333 80 78.57143 90.90909 100
HS6 USNA 88 100 100 100 100 95.2381 95.2381 100
HS6 NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 93.93939 78.78788 88.46154
HS6 AOCS 88 100 100 92.68293 100 91 .66667 71.42857 76.92308
HS6 USNA 87 100 100 90.90909 90 77.77778 100 100
HS6 NROTC 87 95.45455 100 100 95 82.6087 90 94.73684
HS6 AOCS 87 100 93.75 95.65217 87.23404 75 87.80488 97.14286
HS6 USNA 86 100 100 100 90.90909 100 100 81.25
HS6 NROTC 86 100 96.15385 84.61538 77.27273 100 95 77.77778
HS6 AOCS 86 100 81.81818 80.55556 90 92.85714 100 80.76923
HS6 USNA 85 100 94.73684 94.44444 81.25 100 85.71429 83.33333
HS6 NROTC 85 100 82.35294 92.85714 92.30769 92.30769 100 92.30769
HS6 AOCS 85 85.71429 100 77.77778 100 85.71429 83.33333 100
HS6 USNA 84 85.71429 100 85.71429 100 100 70 100
HS6 NROTC 84 100 100 100 87.5 100 100 100
HS6 AOCS 84 84.61538 95.45455 100 90 61.11111 100 100
HS USNA 89 100 100 85.71429 100 100 100 71.42857
HS NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 95.2381 95 94.73684
HS AOCS 89 100 100 100 83.33333 72.72727 100 100
HS USNA 88 100 100 100 100 94.44444 94.11765 87.5
HS NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 91 .66667 95.45455 100
HS AOCS 88 100 93.54839 93.10345 92.59259 76.92308 90.47619 100
HS USNA 87 100 100 100 75 66.66667 75 100
HS NROTC 87 100 95.83333 95.65217 91.30435 95.83333 91.30435 95
HS AOCS 87 98.11321 88.46154 93.47826 80 91.89189 93.93939 100
HS USNA 86 100 100 92.30769 66.66667 100 100 87.5
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HS NROTC 86 100 100 84.61538 83.33333 100 100 80
HS AOCS 86 100 95.45455 100 85.71429 94.44444 100 88.23529
HS USNA 85 100 100 66.66667 100 100 100 100
HS NROTC 85 100 91 .66667 90.90909 90 100 100 50
HS AOCS 85 100 86.66667 66.66667 100 100 87.5 100
HS USNA 84 92.30769 91 .66667 86.36364 95 89.47368 94.11765 93.75
HS NROTC 84 82.35294 61.53846 100 100 87.5 71.42857 100
HS AOCS 84 95 86.8421
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100 96.66667 86.66667 88.46154 95.65217
FSH USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH AOCS 88 100 100 100 50 100 100 100
FSH USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH AOCS 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH USNA 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH NROTC 86 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH AOCS 86 66.66667 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH NROTC 85 100 50 100 100 100 100
FSH AOCS 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH NROTC 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FSH AOCS 84 100 100 100 100 100 100
HCV USNA 89 100 100 94.44444 94.44444 93.75 100 100
HCV NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 97.67442 97.61905 92.68293
HCV AOCS 89 100 100 94.11765 87.5 82.14286 94.73684 77.77778
HCV USNA 88 96 100 96.55172 93.33333 92 76.19048 93.75
HCV NROTC 88 100 100 97.36842 100 88.57143 73.33333 91.30435
HCV AOCS 88 100 93.02326 97.56098 97.5 72.22222 85.18519 95.65217
HCV USNA 87 100 100 100 100 77.77778 71.42857 100
HCV NROTC 87 100 100 96.42857 100 84 77.27273 94.11765
HCV AOCS 87 97.22222 94.02985 89.0625 77.58621 77.09302 80.64516 95.65217
HCV USNA 86 100 100 85.71429 100 100 83.33333 100
HCV NROTC 86 100 100 66.66667 90.90909 100 90.90909 87.5
HCV AOCS 86 93.87755 92.68293 89.18919 71.875 78.26087 94.11765 76.47059
HCV USNA 85 100 88.23529 80 63.63636 100 100 85.71429
HCV NROTC 85 100 84.61538 86.36364 100 94.44444 81.25 69.23077
HCV AOCS 85 96.15385 81.81818 84.21053 93.33333 92.30769 81.81818 77.77778
HCV USNA 84 90 75 100 100 80 50 100
HCV NROTC 84 93.33333 92.30769 91 .66667 90 88.88889 100 100
HCV AOCS 84 76.47059 80.76923 100 89.47368 56.25 88.88889 100
HMV USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 80
HMV NROTC 89 100 85.71429 100 100 100 100 100
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HMV AOCS 89 100 100 100 80 100 100 100
HMV USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100
HMV NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HMV AOCS 88 100 85.71429 100 100 77.77778 71.42857 100
HMV USNA 87 100 100 100 100 85.71429 50 100
HMV NROTC 87 100 100 100 66.66667 100 50 100
HMV AOCS 87 100 86.66667 91 .66667 91.66667 91 .66667 75 100
HMV USNA 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HMV NROTC 86 100 100 100 100 100 100
HMV AOCS 86 100 83.33333 100 83.33333 60 100 100
HMV USNA 85 100 100 75 66.66667 100 100 100
HMV NROTC 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HMV AOCS 85 100 75 100 100 100 60 66.66667
HMV USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 50 100
HMV NROTC 84 100 50 100 100 100 100 100
HMV AOCS 84 83.33333 80 75 100 100 100 100
HO USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO AOCS 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO AOCS 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO USNA 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO NROTC 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO AOCS 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO NROTC 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO AOCS 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO NROTC 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HO AOCS 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TOTH USNA 89 100 100 97.05882 98.52941 98.48485 92.53731 93.65079
TOTH NROTC 89 100 99.36709 100 100 95.75556 98.06452 90.84967
TOTH AOCS 89 98.24561 100 96.34146 84.33735 83.78378 94.82759 89.09091
TOTH USNA 88 98.64865 100 98.78049 96.34146 93.67089 84.93151 91.93548
TOTH NROTC 88 100 100 98.0198 100 92.23301 83.15789 93.58974
TOTH AOCS 88 100 95.80838 95.15556 97.41935 80.82192 79.33884 89.47368
TOTH USNA 87 100 100 97.72222 93.02326 75 80 100
TOTH NROTC 87 98.96907 97.93814 97.95918 93.87755 86.81319 86.07595 95.45455
TOTH AOCS 87 98.36066 93.24895 92.76018 83.09859 76.13636 85.29412 98.23009
TOTH USNA 86 100 97.87234 87.23404 85.36585 100 97.14286 84.84848
TOTH NROTC 86 100 98.66667 81.08108 83.60656 96.07843 94 79.06977
TOTH AOCS 86 97.35099 90.41096 86.25954 83.03571 86.02151 98.66667 81.33333
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TOTH USNA 85 100 91.07143 82 79.48718 100 89.65517 88.46154
TOTH NROTC 85 100 86.76471 90 94.33962 95.83333 93.02326 75.60976
TOTH AOCS 85 96.9697 85.9375 80 97.56098 95 78.78788 88.88889
TOTH USNA 84 90.90909 88 90.69767 97.4359 92.10526 77.14286 96.2963
TOTH NROTC 84 92.15686 82.22222 97.2973 94.28571 93.75 90 100
TOTH AOCS 84 84.55285 84.61538 98.83721 93.82716 73.33333 90 97.77778
UNK USNA 89 100 100 90 100 100 100 100
UNK NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 50
UNK NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK AOCS 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK AOCS 87 100 82.6087 93.33333 100 100 100 100
UNK USNA 86 100 100 84.61538 100 100 100 100
UNK NROTC 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK AOCS 86 100 100 60 100 100 100 100
UNK USNA 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK NROTC 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK AOCS 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK USNA 84 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK NROTC 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
UNK AOCS 84 100 100 100 100 100 100
ALL USNA 89 100 99.39024 98.42932 97.46193 97.93814 93.12169 88.06818
ALL NROTC 89 100 99.36508 98.28571 98.5755 96.83908 95.50898 89.375
ALL AOCS 89 99.11504 99.01478 97.56098 89.16256 86.8421
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91.71975 85.8156
ALL USNA 88 99.32432 99.08676 98.64253 97.66355 95.2381 83 86.90476
ALL NROTC 88 100 97.98658 97.38562 98.08307 93.20388 84.07778 87.60331
ALL AOCS 88 99.57537 95.31915 95.50562 92.67139 83.46457 78.41945 82.21344
ALL USNA 87 100 98.25581 95.26627 93.75 80.13245 79.33884 89.13043
ALL NROTC 87 99.25094 97.37828 98.86792 93.25843 84.27419 83.17308 87.05882
ALL AOCS 87 99.18589 93.37017 89.20118 84.05316 73.26733 79.8913 89.00344
ALL USNA 86 99.4186 97.10983 91.66667 86.84211 85.8209 89.47368 81.18812
ALL NROTC 86 99.52607 94.73684 83.33333 79.51807 83.7037 90.17857 79.38144
ALL AOCS 86 97.71529 80.72072 77.67857 81.34111 80.21583 91.74312 85.64356
ALL USNA 85 98.11321 81.64557 76.74419 90 90.90909 89.74359 83.82353
ALL NROTC 85 95.12195 78.06452 86.17886 89.62264 93.75 90.90909 70
ALL AOCS 85 83.77193 71.42857 76.86567 93 91.30435 79.74684 89.23077
ALL USNA 84 86.58537 78.6269 78.76106 95.45455 93.9759 81.57895 98.36066
ALL NROTC 84 79.86111 65.51724 84 91.93548 85.96491 87.5 100
ALL AOCS 84 72.12276 68.21429 87.43455 95.625 80.26316 88.52459 95.3271
VF USNA 89 100 100 100 93.75 100 100 92.30769
VF NROTC 89 100 100 94.73684 100 100 95 100
VF AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 100 91.66667 90.90909
VF USNA 88 100 100 100 94.73684 100 90 88.88889
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VF NROTC 88 100 91.66667 100 100 100 95.2381 90
VF AOCS 88 100 97.61905 100 86.36364 92.30769 82.85714 72.41379
VF USNA 87 100 100 100 91.66667 100 75 85.71429
VF NROTC 87 95 100 100 95.2381 94.73684 90 55.55556
VF AOCS 87 100 98.21429 96.42857 98.21429 78.57143 76.59574 69.69697
VF USNA 86 100 100 93.33333 82.35294 86.66667 91 .66667 81.81818
VF NROTC 86 100 93.33333 86.66667 100 57.14286 87.5 100
VF AOCS 86 100 90.19608 80.85106 94.59459 77.14286 80.64516 83.33333
VF USNA 85 100 100 71 .42857 100 85.71429 100 80
VF NROTC 85 90 55.55556 80 100 100 100 33.33333
VF AOCS 85 94.11765 75 66.66667 77.77778 100 83.33333 66.66667
VF USNA 84 100 71.42857 80 100 100 100 100
VF NROTC 84 45.45455 80 75 100 100 100 100
VF AOCS 84 57.57576 42.10526 75 100 100 100 100
VAL USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VAL NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VAL AOCS 89 100 94.73684 100 94.73684 84.21053 100 83.33333
VAL USNA 88 100 100 100 94.44444 100 89.47368 100
VAL NROTC 88 100 95.2381 100 100 96.42857 92.59259 88
VAL AOCS 88 100 96.875 97.56098 97.77778 90.90909 85.36585 80
VAL USNA 87 100 100 89.47368 100 90 83.33333 85.71429
VAL NROTC 87 100 100 100 94.73684 90 90 88.23529
VAL AOCS 87 100 97.14286 85.91549 85.71429 72.72727 76.19048 87.5
VAL USNA 86 100 93.75 87.5 88.88889 93.75 93.75 93.33333
VAL NROTC 86 100 100 88.88889 100 77.77778 100 37.5
VAL AOCS 86 95.12195 76.47059 64.10256 84.61538 86.36364 86.95652 90
VAL USNA 85 100 85.71429 83.33333 100 93.33333 92.85714 84.61538
VAL NROTC 85 100 100 90.90909 70 100 100 71 .42857
VAL AOCS 85 80 93.33333 92.85714 92.30769 84.61538 80 87.5
VAL USNA 84 88.88889 82.35294 86.66667 92.30769 100 75 100
VAL NROTC 84 80 50 80 100 75 100 100
VAL AOCS 84 66.03774 78.78788 81.48148 95.45455 90.47619 95.45455 90
VAM USNA 89 100 100 100 85.71429 100 100 80
VAM NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 81.25 100
VAM AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 66.66667 75 100
VAM USNA 88 100 100 100 100 83.33333 90 88.88889
VAM NROTC 88 100 94.11765 100 100 94.44444 94.11765 86.66667
VAM AOCS 88 100 96.2963 96.42857 81.48148 95.2381 89.47368 93.75
VAM USNA 87 100 100 100 100 92.30769 84.61538 100
VAM NROTC 87 100 90.90909 100 100 60 75 100
VAM AOCS 87 100 93.75 97.14286 93.93939 86.66667 79.16667 80
VAM USNA 86 100 100 93.33333 100 71.42857 90 87.5
VAM NROTC 86 100 100 88.23529 88.23529 62.5 70 100
VAM AOCS 86 97.36842 89.47368 82.92683 94.11765 78.125 85 76.47059
VAM USNA 85 87.5 57.14286 80 100 60 66.66667 100
VAM NROTC 85 85.71429 100 87.5 100 85.71429 100 60
75
VAM AOCS 85 80 53.84615 75 100 100 85.71429 100
VAM USNA 84 85.71429 85.71429 71.42857 80 75 100 100
VAM NROTC 84 100 83.33333 80 100 50 100
VAM AOCS 84 80 72.72727 66.66667 100 100 75 100
VAQ USNA 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VAQ NROTC 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VAQ AOCS 89 100 100 100 100 88.88889 100 40
VAQ USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VAQ NROTC 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 87.5
VAQ AOCS 88 100 100 100 72.72727 100 71.42857 42.85714
VAQ USNA 87 100 100 83.33333 80 100 75 100
VAQ NROTC 87 100 85.71429 100 100 100 75 83.33333
VAQ AOCS 87 90 88.88889 100 91.66667 81.81818 100 100
VAQ USNA 86 100 100 100 100 60 66.66667 66.66667
VAQ NROTC 86 100 100 100 100 100 100
VAQ AOCS 86 100 94.11765 88.23529 80 75 100 77.77778
VAQ USNA 85 100 80 75 66.66667 100 100 100
VAQ NROTC 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
VAQ AOCS 85 100 66.66667 100 100 100 100 100
VAQ USNA 84 100 100 66.66667 100 100 100 100
VAQ NROTC 84 42.85714 66.66667 50 100 100 100 100
VAQ AOCS 84 66.66667 57.14286 75 100 100 100 100
VS USNA 89 100 100 100 100 85.71429 100 100
VS NROTC 89 100 100 85.71429 100 100 100 100
VS AOCS 89 100 100 100 71.42857 60 75 100
VS USNA 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 84.61538
VS NROTC 88 100 100 100 90.90909 100 100 91 .66667
VS AOCS 88 95.23809 88.88889 87.5 85.71429 92.30769 83.33333 81.81818
VS USNA 87 100 100 100 100 100 80 100
VS NROTC 87 100 100 100 100 90.90909 90 66.66667
VS AOCS 87 100 100 97.14286 94.28571 84.84848 57.69231 80
VS USNA 86 100 90 100 100 88.88889 62.5 40
VS NROTC 86 88.88889 100 62.5 100 100 83.33333 100
VS AOCS 86 100 87.23404 70.73171 96.42857 81.48148 86.66667 100
VS USNA 85 100 87.5 42.85714 100 75 100 100
VS NROTC 85 100 100 100 83.33333 100 100 66.66667
VS AOCS 85 100 55.55556 60 66.66667 50 100 100
VS USNA 84 85.71429 80 100 100 100 100
VS NROTC 84 100 20 100 100 100 100 100
VS AOCS 84 81.25 52 64.28571 100 100 85.71429 100
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